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It is not difficult to find examples of philosophers and writers who have given to this sense 
that our place in the world is precarious; that the world is, at best, disinterested in human life, and, 
at worst, hostile to it. Hume provides a fine example of this feeling in his attack on the design 
argument. Sure, the world provides us with examples of ‘prodigious variety and fecundity’, but 
these very existences, so admired by the supporters of the design argument, are ‘hostile and 
destructive to each other’. The uncaring, violent nature of the world’s processes leads him to this 
startling description of the world: ‘The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, 
impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or 
parental care, her maimed and abortive children!’1 And Hume is not alone in his description of the 
world as a terrifying place. For Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80), death renders life and the human 
project absurd. Why? Because any sense that death brings life to completion, or that it is ‘the 
resolved chord [that] is the meaning of the melody’,2 misses the fact that death is often unexpected, 
happening when human projects are incomplete, and things have been left unsaid. There is little 
indication in Sartre’s writings that concern for human life informs the structures of the world. 
Similarly, the sense that life is not only absurd but also takes place within a universe unmoved by 
human concerns is reflected in the philosophy that informs the writings of the Marquis de Sade 
(1740–1814). For Sade, Nature’s processes are to be replicated in the actions of his libertines, who 
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show neither mercy nor concern for their victims. ‘In Nature,’ he notes, ‘…we detect [no] law other 
than self-interest, that is self-preservation.’3  
Such comments convey something of the appeal of the supernatural. A commitment to a 
supernatural form of religion suggests that this world can be escaped, that there is another, better 
world. William James (1842–1910) notes that such religious beliefs are associated with what he 
calls ‘the sick soul’. By this phrase he designated the person who looks at the world, who perceives 
it as merely the abode of suffering and death, and who longs for a better world to take its place.4 We 
have suggested the problem of seeking to replace this messy world with adherence to another plane 
of existence: all too easily such ideas can be adapted to support inhuman and violent actions. Our 
goal, then, is to offer an alternative account of religion that locates the religious impulse within the 
same processes that define us as human. Our aim is to celebrate the mutability of things that we 
often find disturbing, rather than to attempt to find an answer that effectively distances us from 
these unpleasant and troubling experiences. In suggesting that such an approach might be possible, 
the final section of this book considers two rather unlikely sources for constructing a revised vision 
of the nature of religion.  
 
Freud: Transience and the Religious Animal 
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), as we have seen in chapter three, argues that the psychological origin 
of religion is to be found in the infant’s engagement with a threatening universe. The child’s 
perception of the father’s power – both to save and to destroy – lends itself to the creation of God-
the-Father. For our purposes, a significant part of Freud’s analysis lies in his claim that what 
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motivates the religious construction is the desire to make oneself feel safe in a threatening universe; 
as he puts it, to ‘feel at home in the uncanny’.5 Moreover, it is this desire that drives the 
development not just of religion, but that of civilization itself.  
 What does it mean to suggest that the human enterprise is to find out how one might feel ‘at 
home in the uncanny’? It is perhaps helpful to offer a transliteration of Freud’s German at this point, 
for the word translated into English as ‘uncanny’ is unheimlich (‘unhomely’). How is one to feel ‘at 
home in the unhomely’?6 The human animal is, after all, one that is not wholly at home in the 
natural world. This sense that the world is not altogether hospitable towards us seems to inform the 
supernatural concerns given expression in some religious beliefs: our real home apparently lies 
somewhere other than this planet. And indeed it is important to note that human life does seem to be 
by those things and activities that differentiate us from nature. There is a kind of artificiality about 
human behaviour that distances us from other animals and suggests that somehow we are able to 
transcend the physical world.7 This apparent ability to transcend the physical place in which we find 
ourselves (through, say, thought, reading, art) is common to many human activities, not just 
religious ones. Indeed, Freud explicitly connects the impulses that lead to the need for civilization 
(the desire to resist nature and fate) with the same impulses that give rise to the development of 
religion. As he puts it: ‘religious ideas have arisen from the same need as have all the other 
achievements of civilisation: from the necessity of defending oneself against the crushingly superior 
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force of nature’.8 Religion is thus grounded in the same impulses and concerns that have affected 
the development of human society and the construction of human being itself. 
 
Now, this suggests a rather different view of the meaning of religion than has hitherto been 
considered when addressing Freud. In these comments, Freud apparently sees religion not so much 
as an illusory way of thinking about life that exists in isolation from other human ways of dealing 
with their environment. Rather, he suggests that religion is grounded within the general human 
experience of not feeling at home in this world, and it is this experience that motivates all kinds of 
human activities, not just religious ones.  
 
 
At the same time, Freud suggests that religion is grounded in the peculiarities of human 
psychosexual development. As we have seen in chapter three, Freud describes religion as a form of 
obsessional neurosis. But, again, this claim should be placed in the context of his more general 
reflections on what it is to be human. Invariably, Freud seeks to disturb any straightforward 
distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour. As he puts it, ‘every normal person, in fact, 
is only normal on the average. His ego approximates to that of the psychotic in some part or other 
and to a greater or lesser extent.’9   
With this in mind, consider the similarities that Freud discerns between religious rituals and 
the obsessive actions through which the neurotic seeks to render safe their frightening world. 
Neurotic ceremonials ‘consist in making small adjustments to particular everyday actions, small 
additions or restrictions or arrangements, which have always to be carried out in the same, or in a 
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methodically varied, manner’.10 To an observer, these actions might appear meaningless, but for the 
patient this is far from the case, for ‘any deviation from the ceremonial is visited with intolerable 
anxiety’.11 The ceremonial is ‘a “sacred act”’,12 similar to, although not exactly like, a religious 
ritual, most notably because these actions do not have the public and communal quality of religious 
practice, but are, rather, forms of ‘private religion’.13 Freud aims to show how such actions are 
related to specific repressed events in the patient’s life. These actions are thus highly meaningful, 
providing ways of coping – however inappropriately – with unresolved issues and repressed 
instincts.   
   
Of course, Freud’s intention in exposing the sources of such actions is to cure the patient: 
once the origin of the obsessive act is revealed, they will be able to let go of the action. And the 
same goes for the illusion that is religion, for religion is ‘a universal obsessional neurosis’.14 Yet 
this very description of religion as ‘a universal obsessional neurosis’ presumably suggests much 
about how all humans, not just neurotics, attempt to come to an accommodation with the world that 
threatens to consume and destroy them. 
So how might one attempt to come to an accommodation with this threatening, terrifying 
world? Supernatural religion offers one way: attention is paid to a world that is believed to 
transcend this one. But Freud provides an alternative perspective that suggests the celebration of 
transience, rather than a denial of its force.    
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In his essay ‘On Transience’, Freud suggests that the belief that it is possible to transcend this 
human realm may not be the only way in which this life can be rendered meaningful. He describes a 
conversation with two young friends, one of whom (a poet) is deeply depressed by the inevitable 
destruction of natural beauty, believing that it is impossible to find meaning in a world that is 
subject to decay and death. (Matthew von Unwerth has argued, rather convincingly, that the poet is 
Rainer Maria Rilke, and the other participant in this conversation is Freud’s confidante Lou-
Andreas Salomé.15) The poet identifies the fundamental transience of the world as the source of his 
unhappiness, and Freud reflects upon the different ways in which one might respond to this 
ephemerality. The poet has shown one possible way of responding: ‘aching despondency’. All is 
dust, and to dust all shall return. Alternatively, one might experience ‘rebellion against the fact 
asserted’.16 This beauty cannot be destined for destruction, and in this refusal of transience lies the 
seeds of the belief in (or, as Freud sees it, the wish for) immortality. Freud, however, resists both 
approaches. The first is too pessimistic; the second is illusory, based in the dubious conclusion that 
what is so lovely cannot, ultimately, be destroyed (‘what is painful’, he observes, ‘may none the less 
be true’17). Instead, he considers what kind of value the fragile beauty of the physical world might 
have, and concludes: ‘Transience value is scarcity value in time. Limitation in the possibility of an 
enjoyment raises the value of the enjoyment.’18 The very fragility of that which causes the poet’s 
agony is what makes it so lovely in the first place. Freud goes on to suggest a this-worldly view of 
what is eternal. He highlights the cyclical nature of things: Nature’s beauty, destroyed in winter, 
returns in the spring, so that ‘in relation to the length of our lives it can in fact be regarded as 
                                                 
15 Matthew von Unwerth, Freud’s Requiem: Mourning, Memory and the Invisible History of a 
Summer Walk, London: Continuum, 2005. 
16 Freud, ‘On Transience’ (1916), Standard Edition, vol. 14, London: Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 305. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
eternal’.19 Freud suggests that we should accept the fragility of things, and value them precisely 
because of this fragility. As he rather poetically puts it: ‘A flower that blossoms only for a single 
night does not seem to us on that account less lovely.’20 Perhaps it is possible to accept the passing 
nature of things, to find in their very mutability beauty and value. 
 
To read Freud in this way, to consider some of his ideas that are not usually highlighted, is 
to find sources for a this-worldly form of religion. And arguably what he presents us with is still a 
religious viewpoint, for he draws our attention to the ritualistic nature of the human animal, thus 
grounding religion in those very activities that differentiate us from the rest of the animal world. 
The human animal is the ritualistic or religious animal. At the same time, Freud offers us a way of 
engaging with the passing nature of things, and allows a perspective to develop which grounds the 
meaning and beauty of the world in its transient, seasonal nature. Perhaps we can find a way in 
which religion can co-exist with an affirmation of what it is to be human in a world like this?   
 
Dennis Potter: Religion and the ‘Wound’ of Being Human 
What we are suggesting, then, is that it might be possible to develop a form of religiosity that is not 
about providing answers to the problems of life, but that emanates from the human engagement 
with the world. Our second source suggests ways of developing this perspective. The controversial 
playwright Dennis Potter has been described by D. Z. Phillips as a ‘priest of our time’.21 For 
Phillips, Potter represents those who feel uncertain when confronted with religious claims; and 
particularly when confronted with the transcendent values that seem to permeate many religions. 
Many of Potter’s plays deal with specifically religious themes, albeit in unconventional and often 
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highly controversial ways. Brimstone and Treacle exemplifies this trend. Here, the day-to-day life 
of Mr and Mrs Bates, a couple caring for their severely disabled daughter, is interrupted by Martin, 
a strange, possibly demonic, possibly angelic, young visitor. Martin, while supposedly caring for 
their daughter, rapes her. During one such rape she recovers consciousness: the demonic has 
apparently ‘saved’ her.22 This is a shocking, disgusting and disturbing idea. Potter’s plays invariably 
unsettle us, and this has led some to characterize his work as ‘blasphemous’. Yet it is a strange kind 
of blasphemy, for in his last interview Potter made a point of referring to the importance of the 
spiritual. What did he mean by this? Importantly, his vision of the spiritual is not one that is 
juxtaposed to the physical: God is not to be understood as standing apart from the world, in 
contradistinction to that which is human. And Potter is careful not to frame his understanding of 
religion in the language of theism. Indeed, he is at pains to reject the traditional view of God, 
interestingly, because he sees such a conception as being based upon the attempt to terrorize human 
beings into accepting ‘Him’: 
 
I mean, the kind of Christianity, or indeed any other religion, that is a religion because of the 
fear of death, or hope that there is something beyond death, does not interest me. I thought, 
what a cruel old bugger is God, if it’s terror that is the ruling edifice, if you like, of the 
structure of religion? And too often for too many people it is. Now that to me isn’t religion.23 
 
In place of this kind of religion, he returns to a description that he had previously given of what he 
considers religion to be: ‘religion to me has always been the wound, not the bandage’.24 Religion is 
not there to augment human life, or to apply salve to the hurts and pain which invariably afflict us. 
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Religion, he seems to suggest, should not attempt to cover up the wounds of life – should not, in 
this sense, seek to act as a bandage – but should instead confront and engage with all aspects of 
existence. It should not attempt an escape from life: not an escape from its beauty and enjoyments, 
nor an escape from its horrors and fears. Rather, it should be grounded in deep reflection upon all 
that we experience.25 
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